## Russian Diplomatic \& Intelligence stations



M42, M42b, F01, F06, F06a, X06

First edition: March 1995 Last revision: $\mathbf{2 3}$ February 2023

Editor: Ary Boender © Worldwide Utility News,
Numbers \& Oddities, and UDXF - Utility DXers Forum www.numbersoddities.nl www.udxf.nl
Keywords:
KGB, GRU, FSB, SRV, FAPSI, MFA


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## Chapter 1: Description and designators

Although the number of numbers station decreased since 1989, the Russians still operate a lot of them. It is hard, if not impossible, to find out if the transmissions are actually related to espionage activities. Some of them are probably spy stations, or at least used by the secret services to communicate with their operatives outside Russia. Some are definitely linked to governmental communications (embassy traffic etc.), and a lot of them are military stations, either GRU related or just plain military activity (tactical nets, naval stations, etc.). The military stations are however not the scope of this document and are therefore omitted.

Designators for the Russian diplomatic stations, intelligence stations and government stations described in this document:

1. Enigma/N\&O/Priyom designators: F01, F06, F06a, M42, M42b, X06
2. Enigma codes for Israeli nets including Moscow: M43 (see also the separate M43 document)

## Note:

M42 is not only used for the diplomatic and intelligence services, but also for other government related networks. Most of the alledged government owned point-to-point stations are coded as M42b.


Ministry of Foreign Affairs at
32 Smolenskaya-Sennaya Square, Moscow


Lourdes SIGINT complex. Cuba

## Chapter 2: History

The Russian diplomatic/intelligence digital modes networks have been monitored by a large number of dxers since the early 1980's and even before that time when they were using Morse only. When we first discovered these networks we didn't know who they were, so we nicknamed them "the Brotherhood". A couple of years and a lot of work later we know that these nets are in fact Soviet (now Russian) governmental/intelligence networks. In the 1990's a new name was used to identify them. According to several sources the main user of the net was SOUD, so this name replaced "the Brotherhood". If SOUD really was involved is questionable. SOUD traffic was probably sent through the same channel, along with all other traffic, but I seriously doubt that SOUD was the main user. Later we called the net "FAPSI".

## Why FAPSI?

In 1995 by decree of President Boris Yeltsin all cryptographic systems except those licensed by FAPSI were forbidden in the Russian Federation. There are widespread rumors that all systems licensed by FAPSI have backdoors allowing the agency to freely access the encrypted information. Since 1998 FAPSI required that all Internet providers in Russia had to install their hardware named SORM (COPM - Система Оперативно-Розыскных Мероприятий, System of Operative Investigative Actions) that allows filtering and remote control of internet traffic from the FAPSI headquarters.

FAPSI was also responsible for maintaining both the governmental and presidential information systems and telecommunication lines. The agency controlled Russia's physical communications systems, including government telephone lines, high-frequency communications, and cryptography services. FAPSI initially maintained communications lines for the Russian President and security services. Basically they were responsible for the actual transmissions. Following a reorganisation in 2003 FAPSI was dissolved and its functions, personnel and infrastructure has been distributed between the FSB and the Ministry of Defense.

One of the other names that was used after FAPSI is DOSC, Department of State Communications, a name that is more appropriate than the ones used before that. To simplify it even more we now use Russian Diplo/Intel, Russian Intel. or Russian Diplo when the transmission is recognized as a diplomatic transmission.

The first encounters in the USA with the Russian diplo/intelligence stations were in the late 1970's when they still used high speed CW (ca. 32 WPM). Most of the early CW stations (PSN, BPA, SPK, WNY, YBU) were still active in the late 1990's. "ROL" however disappeared completely. In the mid 1980's the RTTY transmissions started. The speed used was 50bd. Messages to YBU were the most common ones in those days. Also messages to PSN were monitored. The callup was different from the system that is used nowadays:

```
VVV PSN PSN PSN 2/245 VVV PSN PSN 2/245
NW NW
NR 271 GR 135
+5L or 5F groups
```

Then, in the mid 1980's they started to use preambles consisting of five 5 -figure groups, very similar to the ones that are used today. But the link designators were different back then, although some re-appeared in 2017.

The WFO/MIG link was the only known 2-way link in the Americas. The station sending WFO was definitely the Russian embassy in Managua, Nicaragua. The other end, MIG, was the Russian embassy in Havana, Cuba.

In the late 1980's the European network of RTTY stations popped up, similar to the network that was active in the America's. The master station in Europe was "RCF". Several frequency guides listed "RCF" as Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. After the disintegration of the USSR, the "RCF" callsign disappeared. The new master station was as powerful as "RCF" was and one thing is for sure: this station was located in or very near Moscow as well. The station was DFed many times and every time Moscow appeared to be the source of the signal. Whether the master station or "RCF" really was MFA Moscow is not $100 \%$ sure but it definitely was a diplo station and the net a diplo network. Whenever something hot was happening in the 1990's, like the Chechenya actions, the stations in this net were making overtime, even on Sundays, while there were normally no transmissions on Sundays. The only station that was often heard on Sundays was "BFR", which was an indication that it was possibly located in an Islamic country or in Israel. Later we learned that BFR is the Russian embassy, Damascus, Syria.

The MFA transmitted online and offline encrypted messages to the other stations. There were fixed schedules for a couple of stations while others are reported less frequently. During the time that "RCF" was still in place they used a traffic list system. In the 1990's the traffic list system was replaced and each link now had one or two fixed schedules on an assigned frequency pair. The auto-broadcasts to amongst others KUL, VKX, RAU and RKD were probably just circulars or routine traffic sent to the specific networks. They were transmitted blind and therefore repeated throughout the day on several frequencies. They also QSLed received messages.

RTTY was their major system. Later-on Serdolik MFSK-34 became the most popular diplo mode. Nowadays both RTTY and Serdolik MFSK-34 are still being used. The callups and messages can be divided into two groups: the most common one for the America's and Europe was: " 4646464646464646 KUL KUL KUL KUL $1 / 226$ ". Note that 46 's are transmitted instead of RY's, then the callsign of the recipient and the number of messages/number of 5 -letter or 5 -figure groups in this message. The other one was only noted in Europe but might have been expanded to other areas by now. These transmissions started with a selcal of 6tones (the selcal system is called Mazielka), followed by the callsign of the recipient sent in CW, then into RTTY where the preamble is handkeyed while the other system had an automated preamble.

## X06 - Mazielka

The Mazielka is a selcal system that was used by the master station to wake up a station outside the normal fixed sked. It was probably only used to catch the operators attention, not to start the equipment remotely. The fact that they switched to CW after the Mazielka was a sure sign that the operator had to prepare the equipment before they could start the transmission. The use of non-error correcting RTTY systems made it practically impossible to establish a link automatically. The Mazielka was never used during the normal schedule times. Nowadays system seems to be more structured and even has more or less fixed schedules. The MFA in Moscow broadcasts the selcal while waiting for the embassy to initiate a point-to-point link. In case no link has been established, X06 will move to a new frequency until a link has been initiated.

We have found several facts regarding the preambles of the link system that are valid today. Let's take a closer look at the preambles. Each message starts with a preamble that consists of 5 groups, followed by the message itself. A typical preamble looks like this: 1117700142236870501201109.

- 1st group: The message identifier, stating what kind of message it is. This might also be a priority code. 11144, 11166, 11177 and 11199 are the combinations heard so far. The most common are 11177 and 11199 . The latter is being used for QSL purposes.
- 2nd group: The link-identifier, each link has its own id, except for stations who have a two-way link, in that case both stations have the same link-id.
- 3rd group: Could be related to the key. Most of the time a 5 -figure group but also "00000" was regularly noted.
- 4th group: The first two digits are the date and the last three are the message number.
- 5th group: The first four digits represent the number of groups in the message +1 . The extra group is most likely the key ( 3 rd group of the preamble). The last digit is either a " 1 " or a " 9 ".


## Note:

The message header info above dates back to the mid-1990's. The headers have slightly changed and are further described in chapter 10.

After the messages have been sent, the operators sometimes have a little chat. In the America's the conversations were often in poor English while on the European side they often chatted in Cyrillic.

As I mentioned earlier, they also sent QSL messages. The QSL messages were transmitted on other frequencies and even on other days then the day the original messages were sent. These QSL messages are no longer transmitted, as far as I know.

Note that the first group of the QSL preamble is always 11199 and the messages always started with 55555 followed by 77011, while the last groups represent the QSLed message number. A typical QSL preamble and message looks like this:

1119900142000001801000069
5555577011000890009000091


KGB shield

Various RTTY speeds were used on this net in the 1990's. The most common were Baudot 50Bd, 75Bd and 100Bd with 500 Hz shift. Besides RTTY also Serdolik MFSK-34 and Morse have been used. Today a host of digital modes are being used by the supposed Russian Governmental and Intelligence stations.

In the past many Direction Finding activities were conducted with good results. The European master station is located in the Moscow region, while the now defunct WFO/MIG link was the link between Nicaragua and Cuba. Station GMN could have been located in Mexico City. Most transmissions came from either Moscow or Cuba. Only a few other locations are known. See further the callsign list at the end of this document.

Moscow sent messages to many other stations, most likely governmental stations like embassies and consulates. The transmissions from Cuba were to BAR, BPA, HZW, JMS, KAC, NDO, PSN, SPK, WFO, WNY, YBU; all unid locations except for WFO.

There is a very significant feature to the 5-letter traffic. The last group of every message is a simple substitution which indicates the date the message was composed and the group count which is always 3 less than the group count shown in the preamble.

The substitution is:
0 I U Z T R E W A P
0123456789

For example:
1117700148574772681100609
5LGs QKANG XOBJZ $\qquad$ VEVXX UEORW
The last group translates to 26057 -- 26th of the month, 57 groups

## TIKAS and SEE

After the RTTY transmissions or during the broadcasts of the schedules we often saw operator's chats. The words 'TIKAS' and 'SEE' were often used, most of the times when the operators had a 'technical' chat. 'TIKAS' probably comes from Ticai or Tikat which means 'to tick' in various Slavic languages. So TIKAS probably means 'ticker' or 'telex operator / telex / telegram / telex machine' or whatever. The use of SEE in "OM AS SEE A UR PER?" indicates this translation as well (see below for KUA traffic). In this case it would be used as "OM wait, look at your tape"

VNR 05 GR 314
NR 05 GR 314
TIKAS
FOR PTF KUA -AFTER QKY QRZ
ZKUUUUUUKKKKKKAEEX
TIKAS
FOR PTF KUA -AFTER QKY QRZ
QRU SK QRU SK


Telewriter tape

TIKAS in this sense, probably refers to telegram traffic on hand for 'PTF' and 'KUA'. The following chat was heard on link 10163 on 16008 kHz at 0920 UTC, 24-08-1994

H QJU K
OK SEE
OK ASM

1117710163 05870~,2.?КВ660КК 004(9
CFM
64646464

VVV
OM 4TO NE NRAWITS QB ?
ASM QSA BD
063 RPT
WQXKVK OK NOT 23 BD ?
MNQSP ?
UR OP 1 ?
OK SEE HR ALL CFM PSE QSP TIKAS PBLILI QRZ OP 1

RYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRY
OM PSE SA QSP ?
GR? GR ? PBL GR 12345 ?
PSE NRYVR MNI WRK VY QRL
OK ASM EE SEE
PSE QSP TIKAS HR ALL CFM
SEE AGN
05870 PSE K
ASM

HW
GMAGVL QSP VY PSE QSP UR K
OP 1 QRL ?
OK VY OM 4TO NE TAK ?
UR NEW OP ?
OM PSE QSL MY QTC TAK OK ?
OP 1 ALL QSP AFTER ILI PSE QRZ AFTER
OK ?
HR A WRK OP 1 HR ALL CFM OK ?
CFM TKS QSL 1 K

## Chapter 3: Transcripts and examples

A very popular station in the 1990's was the master station in Moscow that sent blind routine messages to KUL, VKX and several others at a fixed daily schedule. Note the "46" test slip instead of "RY". "KUL" is the callsign of the recipient, there are 3 messages with a total of 5355 -letter groups. (messages are shortened)

```
464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646
KUL KUL KUL 3/535 KUL KUL KUL 3/535 KUL KUL KUL 3/535
464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646
KUL KUL KUL 3/535 KUL KUL KUL 3/535 KUL KUL KUL 3/535
464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646
KUL KUL KUL 3/535 KUL KUL KUL 3/535 KUL KUL KUL 3/535
11177 00142 33972 2918101479
POFRE XHTWL EWPXU GARRV PEIFE DFHFB SDSTT BEWPH JXQZN UHLWO
LUKHY MAVLA BGWMU VVHMO TZPTW SSXRX IBSHO JOZND GRDLO NMXYF
QSPSI EXVHM HACFJ KQZFC NYLDC SZDQV TVWPV CNOTP OZAPG ORIJF
1 1 1 7 7 0 0 1 4 2 1 7 7 9 0 2 9 1 8 2 0 1 4 5 9
UODKH MTAUY SSFNC CZANV CAECR SCYIV YCCPI KQQHI QVVUB QURSM
UOZJZ ARRIR ZUTZN ZUBFY XJZPG OZYDY MXGDK CGSEC CERBK JVMZC
QBOZZ BGSSZ YJJKY GUGLV AVRAE YFYPO AVJUX SXFIS NIHOI ZSGMB
1 1 1 7 7 0 0 1 4 2 0 4 0 3 9 2 9 1 8 3 0 2 4 3 9
ENQKZ KJOAN RYVHN VUACC TVZUZ FCLCI ZFMSG PMJKW LGQPV AABAG
WQRML MDWUX PTENU DWIYA XSEZX ZEPPR FOMSX POCLZ PAFTK YTMYZ
YYDIX UJDBB XQPKJ FLUJK HBQOV TEMVJ NGFHZ WYNLY ONBMH IQDJT
QRU QRU SK SK
```

Another one on link 30022 with Ops chat at the end.

RYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRY 1117730022450132088200549

KDRUG ALMIV LPTAT EACKS YBVPF LSCXG AFJII XDAHJ RQMXY JJXFV HAJME EJKMA XMXLE ADMSE DSYHQ ZVAIZ ORANL PEBPI EHPGZ LTYFU OSBBX DBWRM EKOOB NOZVX UPPPW ZVXHC OAETV DQJBR ABQFD TCILT

QSL 4
QRU
CFM TKS GB SK

RYRYRYYYRYYRYRYRYYRYRYRYRYYRYRYYRYYRYRYYRYRYRRYRRYR
QSP QSP QSP TX QSP X ZLD ZLD
1117730022485262088603859

MIPYE KVMGG AOCHW RDJLJ FCMOO UORGV CFKYE PVSLM YMOMY CYBUU
ZYTNE RTPRB QMBUA GKAUP GEMLK HPCVN ZPQYS ODTWT OXUTC UWFWC SINUB RYXCV RDJWC VUNLX CMCMW VHUUK ZFHAJ NYZJO GBIST PXQMA

QRU QSL 4 ALL FM OM PSE DAWWAJ MEDU TXT ES PL PBL OKOLO 15 RUSKIH REGISTROW OK ? TQVELO RABOTATX INA 4E OV?? TKS GB SK SK

Interesting are the schedules that were transmitted. Most of the times the schedules were transmitted after a regular broadcast. This one was sent by GSW.

```
OP TIKAS :
FM 1/9 TO 31/10
QSO 00.05 QSW 16320 / 14440
QSO 08.30 QSW 16320 / 13510
QWK QRR
FM 00.00 TO 07.00 QSW 16320 / 14440
FM 07.00 TO 09.00 QSW 16320 / 13510
FM 09.00 TO 12.00 QSW 11140 / 9320
FM 12.00 TO 22.00 QSW 9320 / 7310
FM 22.00 TO 24.00 QSW 13510 / 12130
QRU QRU SK SK
```

... and another one:
04.00-06.00

QRG 1 18565/16058/15683/13466/12158/11028/10328/8487/8178/7537
QRG 2 14578/11536/11134/8043/7867/7376/6888/5414/5858/5021
06.00-14.00

QRG 1 23170/22825/21860/18587/20071/18234/15683/14578/16337/12158
QRG 2 18234/18573/18617/17488/18364/13466/11028/10218/8877/7833
14.00-18.00

QRG 1 12131/15733/17488/16337/18617/16184/18308/14486/16058/11614
QRG 2 7814/10315/12188/11028/12188/11536/12131/8203/8843/5478
18.00-04.00

QRG 1 10512/10218/11068/8815/10707/8826/8487/7608/7885/5858
QRG 2 6885/6888/7376/6884/6885/6888/5836/5015/5771/4526

OK ?
WRK FM 011180 KWK QUW TO NEXT QWK
ALL OK?
PSE ALL QSP TIKAS
NIL
PSE QSL
CFM
K

Typical in this sample is the 020 sequence. The string is part of the link id of the receiving station ( 2 nd group of the preamble) as you can see in the following sample.

020/020/020/020/020/020/...
ROP ROP ROP QTC ROP ROP ROP QTC ROP ROP ROP QTC ROP ROP ROP QTC 464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464 ROP ROP ROP QTC ROP ROP ROP QTC ROP ROP ROP QTC ROP ROP ROP QTC

Followed by the preamble 1110000020000000805402509 and message 27833011046343619719535795635244915879620684566774 $\qquad$

QSL messages always had 11199 as the first group in the preamble, and began with 55555.
A startling message was sent by YBU. Here is the entire message.

```
111990014800000 2026901759
55555 770119964199749997369971999726996679963599749
99736997109975099736 997519976299640996079974999736
9974899749 9973644326997369961299721997369970599736
9967899736996888997449964199744996419963599696 99696
99641996554432699736 996079970499737996889974499641
99744997509975099696996419976899655 443269973699704
996649975199688997449964199744997509975099696 99750
996359965544326 996079975199698997379963999744 99750
99721996889972199641997509974499750996419963699744
997369971199649997369963599696 997369965699736 99635
99641997369974999750997499973699719997569974099736
99687997369961299721997369970599736996789974999677
997369961299736996499963599696 997369968399696 99696
9963999696 99750 996819973699656 9973699765 99635 99639
99765997219968199655997369961299736996499963599641
99683997509976899639997509963699681997499976599749
9973699724 99742997369972599640996479975199676 99775
99747996019974799749
```

Analysis shows that starting at the third group, this message uses a trinomial (3-digit) code. When sent as 5F groups, the first two digits of each 5F group are nulls. All of the code groups begin with either a 6 or a 7 except for the one group (repeated three times in the message) which uses 44 as the nulls.

In 2011, at least one of the old preambles and message formats is still being used:

1110080104000001245305009
followed by 5FGs or 5LGs.

## Serdolik MFSK-34 (CROWD-36)

With the introduction of new systems the formats changed. There are quite a few different formats now. I am not sure if each type is linked to a specific user (i.e. diplo, military, intelligence). Messages nowadays consist of 5LGs, 5FGs, 17FGs, 18FGs or 20FGs.

On Serdolik MFSK-34 channels headers like these are quite common:
RXJZM ITQVB JHSMXV LGET
DJNFCKGZYPAOBG RMLAWWALMR E SIU
VNWGZXYDLU VCXRMWSDABHZJ
VGPLCRI12(@7VGPLCRI12(@7
RNCTLHPOGMV DCWOX

Other formats on non Serdolik MFSK-34 channels:
Multifigure groups e.g. 422140226144418178=

Chapter 4: M42b

The stations listed as M42b are believed to be government owned point-to-point stations.
Traffic usually consists of operator chats in Morse and messages sent in Baudot ITA2 50Bd/500Hz. Sometimes other speeds are used. Most of the nets are duplex nets with more or less fixed schedules.

## Traffic:

5112 kHz, operator chat in CW:
PLF3 PLF3 PLF3 DE KUWF KUWF K
R 5670037 K

## 5112 kHz, FSK 50/500

RYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRY

## 1471301800002581

99468979053362694120138014188178236045161597787499
42425588591274756108815994780895339800859098463293 27597666665530050258748844679521393279835509704741 61761137023258282192550567825233601934738276214434 $60167965110668877126608582936295223919742908906838=50=$ 59056985469511753062493672632937065875411585952278 63799737258658408174480239953669950025772537599306 84706095823432952401126623518508178999671936131573 60646891178189068066795188693551517118427265362360 96149947172609992076440005940569375299908388279496 =100= 23026075690286050960165968652515029649118459056063 27986684321592990502886498960893503481023293684654 04468469077103359469613769728288637493410142679517 0018

## Operator chat in CW:

CFM NL K. SK SK

## The other station is on 5371 kHz. Its operator sends in CW:

KUWF DE PLF3

## 5112 kHz sends its second message in FSK 50/500

2101302000003241
99468979053362694120138014188178236045161597787499
42425588591274756108815994780895339800859098463293 27597666665530050258748844679521393279835509704741 61761137023258282192550567825233601934738276214434 60167965110668877126608582936295223919742908906838 =50= 59056985469511753062493672632937065875411585952278 63799737258658408174480239953669950025772537599306 84706095823432952401126623518508178999671936131573 60646891178189068066795188693551517118427265362360 96149947172609992076440005940569375299908388279496 =100 $=$ 23026075690286050960165968652515029649118459056063 27986684321592990502886498960893503481023293684654 04468469077103359469613769728288637493410142679517 0019

Note the separators after 50 groups. They are typical for M42b traffic. The last $\mathbf{4}$ digits at the end of the message indicate the time.

## Chapter 5: F01 protocol

F01 is based on the ITA2 alphabet. At the normal settings, it uses the speed of 200 bd , the shift of $500 \mathrm{~Hz}, 1.5$ stop bits, the mark frequency of -250 Hz , and the space frequency of +250 Hz .

## Block format

The payload, 5 -digit groups, is packed into 25 -character blocks, which are sent directly one after another without line breaks, of the following fixed structure:
$=825165380484843868036$
$=846230549583192393891$
=7853 29392548929506269
=8554 549410102838013150
$=8635516060140587158102$
..
)69729 0608400000++++++237
ABBBCCCDDDDDEEEEEFFFFFGGG

- A: Indicates the block type, and takes the form of one of the following characters:
- ' $=$ ' indicates that the message will continue in the next block.
- ')' indicates that this is the last block of the message.
- B: Unknown. Related to error detection. Always 3 digits.
- C: Block number. Counted from 1. Padded with spaces from the right if shorter than 3 digits.
- D: First 5-digit group of the 3-group fragment contained by the block.
- E: Second 5-digit group of the 3-group fragment contained by the block.
- F: Third 5-digit group of the 3-group fragment contained by the block.
- G: Unknown. Related to error detection. Padded with spaces from the right if shorter than 3 digits.

If this is the last block of the message, the $D, E$, and/or $F$ slots can be replaced by +++++ if there is no group to place in them. Decoding a message comes down to putting together the 3-group fragments from the blocks in the right order.

There is also an optional block of different format that precedes all the other blocks, and contains a 5-group header in the common Russian intelligence format:
(2111110009777423182507200839
ABBBCCCCCDDDDDEEEEEFFFFFGGGGG

- A: Always '(' - matches ')' from the last block.
- B: Unknown. Related to error detection. Always 3 digits.
- C: First group of the header: message type. F01 usually uses 11177, sometimes 11100.
- D: Second group of the header: link ID, fixed per schedule.
- E : Third group of the header, unknown.
- F: Fourth group of the header. Contains the message date as day of the month in the first two digits, always zero as the third digit, and the serial number between 01 and 99 inclusive in the last two digits.
- G: Fifth group of the header: group count in the first 4 digits.

All blocks are repeated through the broadcast for 6-8 minutes for redundancy.

## Null messages

Null messages are represented by this single block repeated for about 6 minutes:
=5761 00000+++++++++++162

## Multiple messages

It is possible to transmit more than one message in the same broadcast with F01. In that case, the total group count is filled up with the group 00000 until it is a multiply of 10 , then followed by the next message. If a full 5 -group header was included, only the header of the first message in the TX is distinguished using a separate block, while in the following messages it is mixed with normal message groups.

See further: http://priyom.org/number-stations/digital/f01/protocol

## Chapter 6: F01 messages

Null message: 576100000 +++++ +++++

## Standard message:

=8731 735192767493453123
=8162 803474444136411984
=8273 955792213804033108
=8574 616742903078091146
=8005 92446726575694296
=8876 247087126047636103
=8387 976146312769393113
=8438 222975992964973145
$=844956075733275503440$
=81210 995462055135695143
=85511 764960329663211112
=84412 770566608277522116 =80413 278407772807388135 =81614 25237296578967095 =80515 144776311458855123 =81716 72898077276948915 =80917 643073279194075103 =81618543194714106698149 =76919 938446205718862138 =87520 73312813344337998
=82621 037148322931375102
=85222 566858997034138124 =83923 89021853355983485
=84624 39073045838153753
=81525 52636611780117195
=89426 728334103213403144
=86127 669539212724861130
=87828 46587893029008374
=72029 000000000000000107
=72030 00000000000000067
=87031 57203390146269192
=87032 03824963958465485
=85733 32158218366162794
=81534 955505476397666103
=85335 656579426312142144
=7863658612155394396581
=80737 346760421222134113
=78638 39761768787692449
=87539 922286301007718182
=88940 075097417303311107
=80041 39325522941301780
=83842 77857425126454190
=83743 760250284722550105 =82444 67063345689661681 =87445 53634183109327595 =86046 192239547889098123 =85747 42434781124048193 =84548 921667452354614103 =85949 648853175800868141 =80550 309078238965403110 =87051 293122216623632110 =83652 95101888724357491 =85953 899963008612305122 =86354 668845516588348124 =80355 12509462201286785 =85656 291401372417797121 =80557 94254335922344887 =77058 03263033507568984 =8085956018713384398681 =75560 50755437809108967 )57661 00000+++++++++++160

## Same message in 5 -figure group format

73519276749345380347444413641195579221380403361674 29030780919244672657569422470871260476369761463127 69393222975992964973560757332755034995462055135695 76496032966321177056660827752227840777280738825237 29657896701447763114588557289807727694896430732791 94075543194714106698938446205718862733128133443379 03714832293137556685899703413889021853355983439073 04583815375263661178011717283341032134036695392127 2486146587893029008300000

57203390146269103824963958465432158218366162795550 54763976666565794263121425861215539439653467604212 22134397617687876924222286301007718075097417303311 39325522941301777857425126454176025028472255067063 34568966165363418310932751922395478890984243478112 40481921667452354614648853175800868309078238965403 29312221662363295101888724357489996300861230566884 55165883481250946220128672914013724177979425433592 23448032630335075689560187133843986507554378091089 00000 +++++ +++++

F06 is based on a proprietary synchronous BFSK mode. Its standard configuration is speed of 200 bd , shift of 1000 Hz , space ( 0 ) frequency at -500 Hz , and mark (1) frequency at +500 Hz . The binary fields of its protocol use big-endian bit and byte orders.

## Block structure

All the data of the BFSK transmission is split and packed into consecutive ordered 288-bit blocks of the following fixed structure: (hexadecimal/binary representations)

| Sync sequence | Block index with ECC |  | Interleaved payload with ECC |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 7d12b0e6 | 0033 |  | 1f2ab981ebe994c78a5900eb32bb5ded40dd1d4f7fa2f0c603a56bbf64cd |  |
| -bit constant, | 00000000001 | 10011 | 1f2ab981ebe994c78a5900eb32bb5ded40dd | 1d4f7fa2f0c603a56bbf64cd |
| always 0x7d12b0e6 | 11-bit raw block index | 5-bit ECC data | Interleaved 144-bit raw payload with CRC | Interleaved 96-bit ECC data |

The Error-Correcting Code for the block index is not understood, but expected values can be easily acquired empirically, allowing to still use the ECC data to detect corrupted block indices.

The payload is composed of 4 pieces, each separately encoded with ECC and containing 36 bits of raw original data followed by 24 bits of corresponding ECC data (the ECC algorithm is not known). These 4 pieces are interleaved together (a common FEC practice), 4 bits at a time, in the following manner:

|  | Raw original data, 36 bits/piece | ECC data, 24 bits/piece |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Interleaved payload | AJS1BKT2CLU3DMV4ENW5FOX6GPY7HQZ8IR09 | agmsbhntcioudjpvekqwflrx |
| Piece 1 | ABCDEFGHI | abcdef |
| Piece 2 | JKLMNOPQR | ghijkl |
| Piece 3 | STUVWXYZ0 | mnopqr |
| Piece 4 | 123456789 | stuvwx |
| Deinterleaved payload | ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789 |  |

The deinterleaved 144-bit payload then actually contains, at the end, a 16 -bit CRC of the previous 128-bit data. The CRC algorithm is the standard CRC-16-CCITT. This can be used to check and reject corrupted block payloads.

| Deinterleaved 144-bit payload with CRC |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 1be980354f9b4a02d028ec5ebeda1979bbdd |  |
| 1be980354f9b4a02d028ec5ebeda1979 | bbdd |
| 128-bit block payload | 16-bit CRC |

There are two types of block, and the interpretation of the payload of a block depends on its type.

## Metadata blocks

The blocks with indices divisible by 16 , including zero ( $\# 0, \# 16, \# 32, \# 48, \# 64, \# 80, \ldots$ ) are metadata blocks. They are sent at regular intervals through the broadcast and report information on the numbers of blocks and messages contained in the broadcast, and the position where, in which block, to find the start of each message. The 128-bit metadata payload is spread out over eight 16 -bit groups, as follows:

|  | Block and message counts |  | Position of message 1 |  | Position of message 2 |  | Position of message 3 |  |  | Position of message 7 |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hexadecimal | 0862 |  | 0020 |  | 02c0 |  | 0000 |  |  | 0000 |  |
| Binary | 00001000011 | 00010 | 00000000001 | 00000 | 00000010110 | 00000 | 00000000000 | 00000 |  | 00000000000 | 00000 |
| Decimal | 67 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 |
|  | 11-bit block count | 5-bit message count | 11-bit start block index | 5 bits, <br> unused, <br> always 0 | 11-bit start block index | 5 bits, unused, always 0 | 11-bit start block index | 5 bits, unused always 0 |  | 11-bit start block index | 5 bits, unused, always 0 |

[^0]For example, this broadcast contains 67 blocks, on which 2 messages are mapped: the first message starts with block \#1, and the second message starts with block \#22.

This provides for up to seven messages in a broadcast. Most of the time there is only one or maybe two messages in the broadcast, and the remaining, unused message fields are simply set to 0 . A block is never shared between two messages; messages always start with the beginning of a block. In practice, the position of the first message always equals 1 . The block count includes block \#0.

## Message blocks

Message blocks are blocks whose indices, unlike metadata blocks, are not divisible by 16. Each of them is part of one of the possibly several messages in the broadcast. A message can use one of two known encodings for the payload of its blocks:

- Raw binary - the 128 bits or 16 bytes of the payload are simply taken as they are and put together to form a binary message, left to further interpretation. This is used for usual test transmissions, and for rare broadcasts such as F06a.
- A custom encoding used for normal messages based on typical 5-figure groups, mapping binary to decimal digits. 10-bit pieces of the payload are mapped to 3 digits each. A 10-bit value can range from 0 to $1023\left(2^{10}-1\right)$, and is mapped to a 3 -digit string ranging from 000 to 999 , with simplicity, efficiency and very little wasted entropy. 4-digit 10-bit values from 1000 to 1023 are believed to be invalid, and should not be encountered during decoding. The first 120 bits of the 128 -bit payload are encoded through these 10 -bit pieces. The remaining 8 bits at the end are divided into two 4 -bit pieces. In a similar way, a 4 -bit value can range from 0 to $15\left(2^{4}-1\right)$, and is mapped to a single digit from 0 to 9 , while values from 10 to 15 are unused.

|  | Bits 1-10 | Bits 11-20 | Bits 21-30 | Bits 31-40 | . | Bits 101-110 | Bits 111-120 | Bits 121-124 | Bits 125-128 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Binary | 0001101111 | 1010010100 | 0000000101 | 0100101001 | $\cdot$ | 1111000001 | 0011010110 | 0101 |  |
| Decimal <br> digits | 111 | 660 | 005 | 297 | $\cdot$ | 961 | 214 | 8 | 8 |

The decoded payload yields 12 successive 3-digit strings, and 2 extra digits at the end, for a total of 38 digits per block. These digits can be used to reconstitute 5 -figure groups only after being all put together from the different blocks into the whole message, as 5 -figure group boundaries are not aligned with block boundaries, and a 5 -figure group is often split across two successive blocks.

## Separator block

A separator block contains the normal 32-bit synchronization constant 0x7d12b0e6 followed by 256 zero bits. It is not a valid block, and trying to decode it will result in a block \#0 with an incorrect payload CRC, which should be rejected as corrupted. Although its purpose may seem intuitive, it is not known which actual technical constraints, if any, it is supposed to satisfy.

## Broadcast structure

The broadcasts consist of all the blocks in index order, followed by a separator block, repeated over and over for 6 to 8 minutes. Decoding a message comes down to the following steps:

1. Decoding a metadata block to know the number of message blocks to recover and map each message with an ordered list of message block. Any metadata block whose integrity was verified will do.
2. Decoding message blocks to obtain a copy, whose integrity was verified, of the payload of each message block. They don't have to be received or processed in order, and can be taken from any repeated portion of the broadcast; corrupted or already-received blocks can be ignored, until all blocks were decoded.
3. For each message in the broadcast, checking the payload of its first block to determine the payload encoding of this message. (In practice, no instance has been observed of multiple messages using different payload encoding methods inside a single broadcast.)
4. Decoding the payload of every block part of each message. Each payload must be decoded separately, block by block, not as a whole.
5. Putting the decoded payloads back together, in block index order, to reconstitute the messages.
[^1]
## Chapter 8: F06 messages

## Null message:

111668021434567080620004900000000000000000000

## Standard message:

1116640122852361002403029
83417434559795701538972740255674084430149744810265 61191931257976675090236605802871271885667578467272 85121185144180042695087946879848430299060527604032 42144533113192662649483038060906708068101439207701 76470825430452099932669628859237381506481928077385 84852429404242236570734312557636650245565568739019 67333584954392352478939707814723233979378407834051 86136120936662273460559872214104698224679133836340 92124877468844625313036652638624117049945353657198 06062571804191211987229674861894102501901145634562 22098853408212857743631569677471880786827513725039 14669982959325974422479295871677968710559682133279 08609500140349841602025836986393571507036468278082 96992480909629275803654919776219136553055379815053 93259087015682421268339513124919979640355726367734 64825143260883975355972497606155729015499034369267 45882001925917772688649993462769658368264543740935 48651033120685549905875669157333280911225658538720 16294276397171803592190099463481885708994054940524 68201164088568893945726561908769367050609837831173 10750346094866542079965268916596972970901813926005 05051567811261576052314050809561714583299728563016 29052843380237805786399007583607387745783335944414 25711886034157506334913755653775689310609543027259 23230469190799068792865965231728102864171736305977 28644158782605894599884165262272126014202864103018 63750240659602868478222271517959632984329057344230 13641730839107203950033290188961419098391633748702 24175661780646419509692039697842175737015379265310 97000448235012829449240178172594830092788159646073 2430000000


FAPSI SIGINT site near Pskov, Russia

F06a is a variant of the Russian intelligence broadcast system F06. While it mostly uses the same modem protocol, the encoded payload is completely different - it sends an ASCII text file. However, no plaintext has been encountered, only 5-digit and -letter groups. This variant is rare and has only been heard in unscheduled transmissions.

## Payload structure

Instead of the normal encoding for 5 -figure groups, the payload of F06a message blocks is raw binary. The recomposed message payload contains the binary contents of a file, preceded by a 20-byte binary metadata header and followed by some padding.

|  | File size | File name | CRC | File contents | End of file | Padding |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Hexadecimal | 00000621 | $\begin{gathered} 00003030323235 \\ 33 \text { 2e } 544 c 47 \end{gathered}$ | c2452b33 | $\begin{gathered} 313131303020 \\ 313030393720 \\ 3336393837 \ldots 33 \\ 32313739 \end{gathered}$ | 00 | $\begin{aligned} & 9999999999 \\ & 99999999 \end{aligned}$ |
| Decode | 1569 | 002253.TLG |  | $\begin{gathered} 1110010097 \\ 36987 \ldots 32179 \end{gathered}$ |  |  |
|  | 32-bit byte count of file contents | 12-byte ASCII string, 8.3 short file name padded on the left with NUL characters | 32-bit CRC of file contents | Variable-length, raw binary file contents | 0x00-byte marker | Variable number of 0x99 padding bytes |

In practice, the first 10 bits of the file size field are always 0000000000, whereas 5 -figure group messages always use 0001101111 , which allows to detect and identify this payload type. The CRC algorithm seems to be the bitwise NOT of the standard CRC-32.

File contents
Although this payload structure seems able to carry any kind of file, in reports so far all files transmitted contained 8-bit ASCII text with 5 -figure/letter group encrypted contents like in typical Russian intelligence cryptograms. For example:

1110010097369871500202533
89993427105370465567336026359818747257426895311062
01317233427317875721542929665582229348672679179634
[22 lines skipped...]
26225984049117679583951691986597310800992538201179
1557832179

Like normal F06 messages, they start with a 5-group header. It uses message type 11100, possibly because the transmissions are unscheduled. 5 -figure group messages don't include a serial number, group count postamble. The messages appear to be always one group shorter than the group count in the header.

The layout of the text is always the same. Groups are separated by single space characters. The 5-group header is on its own on the first line, and followed by an empty line before the body of the message, formatted with 10 groups on each line. The line breaks used have mostly been CRLF. The file ends with no end-of-line character at the end of the last line.
File names follow the 8.3 format. Names longer than eight characters are truncated down to the first six, with the rest replaced with $\sim 1$; this is how the Windows operating systems represent long file names to old MS-DOS programs. Most file names, with very few exceptions, follow a 6-digit structure exhibiting the serial number and group count of the message inside, and use the TLG type extension, which could stand for telegram.

Example: 002253.TLG
Meaning: 002 = Serial number; 253 = group count; File type extension is TLG or TXT
Besides the ASCII-encoded files, other unidentified binary files are sent. The file names begin with 044 or $444+$ a 2-digit serial number. The files have no extention.

See further: http://priyom.org/number-stations/digital/f06a

## Transmission schedules

F01 and F06 operate in regular schedules. Each schedule consists of three identical transmissions, spaced 10 minutes apart. Each takes place on a different frequency, usually in descending order. When traffic is sent on a schedule, the transmissions may repeat also 24 hours later at the same times and frequencies.

## Message header

| Header: | 1116640122967411002502999 |
| :---: | :---: |
| $1^{\text {st }}$ group: | This group consists of two components: 111 and the message type. |
|  | 111 text message or 444 binary message (seldom used) |
|  | Precedence 00 -drill |
|  | Precedence 44 - flash message |
|  | Precedence 66 - urgent message |
|  | Precedence 77 - standard message |
|  | Precedence 99 - was used in the past for a two-way link QSL message |
| $2^{\text {nd }}$ group: | Link id, representing the addressee being a service and a person representing the Government, FSB, GRU, military attaché, etc. at embassies, consulates, UN, etc. |
| $3^{\text {rd }}$ group: | Crypto variant, where to start the OTP key |
| $4^{\text {th }}$ group: | Date (day) + message number |
| $5{ }^{\text {th }}$ group: | Group count (total message, including the last two groups) $+9,3$ or 1 (message origin) |
|  | 9 - message origin is Moscow |
|  | 3 - message to Moscow, origin is an embassy, consulate, etc. |

## Notes

- F01, F06 and similar M42 messages are sent to embassies, consulates, UN delegates, and other official representatives only.
- Group $2=00000$ is a broadcast to all stations
- Group $1=11100+$ group $2=00000$ is a drill message.
- Group $3=00000$ should be a general broadcast, but there is no $100 \%$ proof of that.
- Diplo or Intelligence origin? Generally the messages consisting of 5-letter groups are related to the diplomatic services while messages consisting of 5-giure groups belong to other services.


## Serial number / group count

The serial number and group count can be found just before the end-of-message group. Here is an example of the message number and group count in the header and at the end of the message:

1117700117816941602501759 (25 is the message number and 175 is the group count, including the last two groups)
93543643191094562591774119138749313879388400868238
etc etc etc
11401185785160912490144325132606968086754460553915
0496743096604582517300000
25173 is the message number followed by the number of groups of the message itself, so minus the last two groups. 00000 means "end of message."

## Null messages / Command messages

This kind of message is a null message, meaning that no message will follow. It does however include the command to change the OTP mentioned in group three. (OTP = One Time Pad).

Example: 111661005356248130010004900000000000000000000

## Triple timestamp

The triple timestamp is the third and deepest known common metadata element. It resides inside the encrypted data of the message. This part (at least) of the message is only encrypted with a key that gets reused message after message, producing visibly similar 5 -figure groups across messages within schedules where this header appears. This allowed us to figure out its existence and contents. The triple timestamp has been seen in several F01 and F06 schedules, and even in the E06 ID 832 replacement of F06 ID 50046.

This header comprises the first 125 -figure groups of the message. It appears that the same clear text 20 digits, containing the timestamp of the message, are simply repeated 3 times in succession.

| First copy |  |  | Second copy |  | Third copy |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Encrypted | $\begin{aligned} & 4774949093 \\ & 92903 \end{aligned}$ | 40530 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline 04816 \\ & 33608 \\ & 57196 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | 63673 | $\begin{aligned} & 4296490189 \\ & 70902 \end{aligned}$ | $82228$ |
| Cleartext | $\begin{aligned} & 3026100026 \\ & 05174 \end{aligned}$ | 00000 | $\begin{aligned} & 30261 \\ & 00026 \\ & 05174 \end{aligned}$ | 00000 | $\begin{aligned} & 3026100026 \\ & 05174 \end{aligned}$ | $00000$ |
|  | 15-digit timestamp, see below | Almost always the same value, assumed to be 00000 . Occasionally 12345 instead. | Timestamp | $\begin{aligned} & 00000 \text { or } \\ & 12345 \end{aligned}$ | Timestamp | $\begin{aligned} & 00000 \text { or } \\ & 12345 \end{aligned}$ |

The message timestamp encodes on 15 digits the date and possibly the time of the writing of the message, following a XX-YY-HH-ZZ-dd-mm-yy-w format, where the meaning of $X X, Y Y$ and $Z Z$ fields are still uncertain: it could be SS:MM:HH ZZ dd-mm-yy w, or XX:YY HH:MM dd-mm-yy w.

| 15-digit message timestamp |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 30 | 26 | 10 | 00 | 26 | 05 | 17 | 4 |
| 00-59 value, possibly seconds | 00-59 value, possibly minutes | Hours, ranging between 09 and 15 | Almost always the same value, assumed to be 00 . <br> Occasionally different, within a big range. <br> Alternate possibility for minutes. | Day of month | Month | Year | Day of week |

## Layering

Each of the metadata elements described above may or may not be present in a transmission. It depends on the habits and characteristics of the mode used, and can even depend on the particular schedule. When several of these elements are present, they naturally layer on top of one another: from outermost to innermost, 5 -group header, serial-GC postamble and triple timestamp. The message date and serial number are the same in the different metadata elements, however the group counts slightly differ.

The payload of a 5-group header is a message which may or may not feature a serial-GC postamble. When both are present, the payload of the serial-GC postamble is only the inner message. So the group count in the 5-group header is always greater than the one in the serial-GC postamble, by a couple groups, to account for the serial-GC postamble and outro groups.

Example F06 message featuring all of 5-group header, serial-GC postamble and triple timestamp:
1116670147632942605700509
52605931029767858128382717398980470943064406567310
85734849029117341859430656656460299578649322808612
85432553111651234995239805021142834108932692413369
24193964246719183939986957864306343908057181358085
17286384243560351866498781394598213735515704800000
Note: thanks for the Priyom team for the Triple Time Stamp and Layering information. See for further information http://priyom.org/number-stations/digital/russian-intelligence-common-metadata http://priyom.org/number-stations/digital/russian-intelligence-common-metadata\#triple-timestamp

The diplomatic network that we monitor transmits a mixture of intelligence, diplomatic and military traffic. In the past most of the transmissions were in AM, USB, CW and RTTY. The first Serdolik MFSK-34 logs are from late 1999 and after that the Russians introduced a host of digital modes. The Mazielka selcal system however, is stil being used.

## Mazielka

See chapter 12.

## Serdolik MFSK-34 (CROWD-36)

Serdolik MFSK-34 is a Soviet MFSK duplex system using 36 tones based on British Piccolo MK1. It is also known as CROWD-36, CIS/Russian Piccolo, URS 18 multitones, CIS 10-11-11 MFSK or CIS-36. This system was replaced in 2018.

## Serdolik version 2

Links are established by scanning 3 duplex channels in a loop, for 30 seconds each, until a timely response is received. On each frequency, a sequence of two tones is transmitted, representing the calling station's numeric address. By default, an established link is in the command state, using 35 -tone 40 Bd MFSK modulation. This state is used only briefly to switch between the different traffic speeds. In the traffic state, 9 different speeds are supported. 200 to $1200 \mathrm{bit} / \mathrm{s}$ use MFSK modulation, while 2400 $\mathrm{bit} / \mathrm{s}$ and up use OFDM instead. The symbol rate of all waveforms is 40 Bd .

## Perelivt

Links are established using a single-tone 3000 Bd 8PSK waveform. Perelivt scans through 3 duplex channels in a loop, calling on each frequency until a timely response is received. There are 2 calling modes: a short one that transmits 4 PSK bursts, changes the frequency after 18 seconds and a long one that transmits 17 PSK bursts, changes the frequency after 60 seconds. After a link is established, full duplex communication is made using one of 3 successively faster waveforms: 66-tone MFSK (default), 128 -tone OFDM, 3 kHz wide, or 128 -tone OFDM, 6 kHz wide. The signal generated by Perelivt is approximately 10 kHz wide. Note that the dial frequency is the center of the 10 kHz passband.

## Note:

Perelivt is a code name created by Priyom to unambiguously refer to all four waveforms as part of a single system. Like "serdolik" (сердолик), "perelivt" (переливт) is a cryptocrystalline mineral. The actual name of the system is unknown.

## 45-tone OFDM \& 112-tone OFDM

Two groups of waveforms of a proprietary full duplex HF communication system. They are used on links with some Russian diplomatic missions, as well as domestic links between transmission centers. The system doesn't support automatic channel scanning. Instead, each link has a pre-defined set of up to 4 duplex channels, which the master station tries for a few minutes each, in order from the highest to the lowest. The system transmits on the upper sideband. Each group is associated with a distinct link establishment system (the bursts).

## 45-tone OFDM

45 carriers, $33.33 \mathrm{Bd}, 62.5 \mathrm{~Hz}$, BPSK
45 carriers, 40 Bd , 62.5 Hz , BPSK
45 carriers, $40 \mathrm{Bd}, 62.5 \mathrm{~Hz}$, QPSK
60 carriers, $35.56 \mathrm{Bd}, 44.44 \mathrm{~Hz}, 8$ PSK
112-tone OFDM
112 carriers, 22.22 Bd, 25.64 Hz , BPSK
112 carriers, 22.22 Bd, 25.64 Hz, QPSK
112 carriers, 22.22 Bd, $25.64 \mathrm{~Hz}, 8$ PSK

X06 a.k.a. Mazielka is a 6-tones diplomatic selcall system used by the MFA in Moscow. Moscow broadcasts the selcal while waiting for the embassy to initiate a point-to-point link. In case no link has been established, X06 will move to a new frequency until a link has been initiated.

## Mazielka tone sequences:

| Tone (Hz) | Number |
| :---: | :---: |
| 815 | 1 |
| 845 | 2 |
| 875 | 3 |
| 910 | 4 |
| 950 | 5 |
| 990 | 6 |

## Variants:

1 tone, 2 tones and 6 tones. 1 and 2 tones are used for tests.

## Test sequences:

$123456,111666,161616,111111,121212$, etc. These are usually sent an hour before transmissions of family 7 stations (E07, F07, M12, P07, XPA1, XPA2, XPB1)

Note that the actual name of the selcal system is unknown. We call it Mazielka, which is a made up word invented in the 1980s by one of the Western military forces.

Below a list of known 6-tone selcalls. They are sent by MFA Moscow.

| 124356 | Russian embassy Dushanbe | 421635 | Russian embassy Oslo |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 125643 | Russian embassy Ulanbatar | 431625 | Russian embassy Warsaw |
| 134265 | Russian embassy Tunis | 432516 | Russian embassy Bern |
| 145632 | Russian embassy Algiers | 435621 | Russian embassy Maputo |
| 153624 | Russian embassy Damascus | 436512 | Russian embassy Harare |
| 154263 | Russian embassy Rome | 452163 | Russian embassy Kabul |
| 156234 | Russian embassy Kampala | 463125 | Russian embassy Rabat |
| 162543 | Russian embassy Nicosia | 465132 | Russian embassy Sofia |
| 164253 | Russian embassy Addis Ababa | 521634 | Russian embassy Bucharest |
| 164532 | Russian embassy Dublin | 532614 | Russian embassy Paris |
| 165324 | Russian embassy Vienna | 534216 | Russian embassy Baghdad |
| 165423 | Russian embassy Brussels | 542136 | Russian embassy Beijing |
| 213546 | Russian embassy Islamabad | 561243 | Russian embassy Helsinki |
| 214356 | Russian embassy Amman | 564213 | Russian Consulate General Bonn |
| 215346 | Russian Consulate General Mumbai | 612534 | Russian embassy Ashgabat |
| 216354 | Russian Consulate General Chennai | 615243 | Russian Permanent Mission to the UN, Geneva |
| 216435 | Russian embassy Dhaka | 621543 | Russian embassy Lisbon |
| 231654 | Russian embassy Abuja | 625413 | Russian embassy Tel Aviv |
| 241563 | Russian Consulate General Karachi | 641523 | Russian embassy Lusaka |
| 246531 | Russian embassy Accra | 645321 | Russian Consulate General Ho Chi Minh City |
| 256134 | Russian embassy Abidjan | ?????? | Russian embassy Havana |
| 256341 | Russian embassy Beirut | 152346 | Unid |
| 261453 | Russian embassy Cairo | 244566 | Unid |
| 263145 | Russian embassy Prague | 122433 | Unid |
| 314265 | Russian embassy Antananarivo | 416253 | Unid |
| 324615 | Russian embassy Madrid | 624153 | Unid |
| 325614 | Russian embassy Nairobi | 214365 | Unid |
| 351264 | Russian embassy Abu Dhabi | 316245 | Unid |
| 352416 | Russian embassy Dar es Salaam | 154632 | Unid |
| 356412 | Russian embassy Berlin | 145234 | Unid |
| 361245 | Russian embassy Copenhagen | 256234 | Unid |
| 362154 | Russian embassy Athens | 454545 | Test |
| 364152 | Russian embassy New Delhi | 436125 | Unid |
| 412356 | Russian embassy Budapest | 216531 | Unid |
|  |  |  |  |

Check the X06 logs database on our website: http://numbersoddities.nl/X06-Logs-Database.zip

In earlier versions of this document we included a list of frequencies. As you see they are no longer included. These nets are using a very large pool of frequencies and they often add new frequencies, so it is almost impossible to keep track of them. The Russians regularly re-use old frequencies so if you need frequencies, I suggest that you look in the Numbers Logs and X06 databases our website. A dump from the known frequencies of the M42 will also be available. This file however will only be updated once or twice per year. Check the files page on http://numbersoddities.nl/files.html


Former KGB building, Lubyanka, Moscow. Picture: Mark A. Wilson

Serdolik MFSK-34 id's (last update 2016)

| 018 | 026 | 037 | 047 | 098 | 099 | 104 | 107 | 111 | 118 | 131 | 137 | 162 | 208 | 212 | 219 | 242 | 513 | 736 | 825 | 842 | 851 | 891 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

F01 link id's (updated Feb 2023)
0001600017 both are transmitted from Cuba.

Active F06 link ID's (updated Feb 2023)
00000100534002340122301546007060146700597020280214

M42 stations with link ID (last updated in 2010)

| Link | TX-call | TX location | RX-call | RX location | Remarks |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 00006 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00007 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00012 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00018 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00020 |  |  | ROP |  |  |
| 00023 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00028 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00029 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 00030 | BFR | Russian embassy, Damascus, Syria | RGA | Moscow, Russia |  |
| 00030 | RGA | Moscow, Russia | BFR | Russian embassy, Damascus, Syria |  |
| 00031 | LKF |  | WCD | Moscow, Russia |  |
| 00031 | WCD | Moscow, Russia | LKF |  |  |
| 00035 |  |  | PAO |  |  |
| 00041 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00050 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00051 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00052 | NXQ | Moscow, Russia | YOA |  |  |
| 00052 | YOA | Moscow, Russia | NQX | Moscow, Russia |  |
| 00054 |  | Moscow, Russia | UDZ21 |  |  |
| 00063 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 00068 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00070 |  | Moscow, Russia | RAU |  | Changed to 60070 |
| 00074 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00075 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00079 |  |  | UGO |  |  |
| 00089 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00090 |  |  | GOD |  |  |
| 00096 |  | Moscow, Russia | FWL |  |  |
| 00097 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 00098 |  | Moscow, Russia | VTX |  |  |
| 00099 |  | Moscow, Russia | RSZ |  |  |
| 00101 |  |  | RKA |  |  |
| 00102 |  |  | UFN |  |  |
| 00102 |  |  | RFU |  |  |
| 00102 | UAN |  | URG |  |  |
| 00102 | URG |  | UAN |  |  |
| 00103 |  |  | U1K |  | U1K noted once |
| 00103 | COY851 | Cuba | YFC |  |  |
| 00103 | YFC |  | COY851 | Cuba |  |
| 00104 |  |  | RPY |  |  |
| 00107 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00110 |  |  | XQW |  |  |
| 00115 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00116 |  | Cuba | BPA |  |  |
| 00117 |  | Cuba | HZW |  |  |
| 00119 |  | Russian embassy, Mexico City | GMN |  |  |


| 00125 | MIG | Russian embassy, Havana, Cuba | WFO | Russian embassy, Managua, Nicaragua |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 00125 | WFO | Russian embassy, Managua, Nicaragua | MIG | Russian embassy, Havana, Cuba |  |
| 00127 |  | Cuba | JMS |  |  |
| 00128 |  | Cuba | KAC |  |  |
| 00132 |  | Russian embassy Beograd, Yugoslavia | RNO |  |  |
| 00135 |  | Cuba | BAR |  |  |
| 00139 |  | Cuba | WNY |  |  |
| 00142 |  | Moscow, Russia | KUL |  |  |
| 00148 |  | Cuba | YBU |  |  |
| 00149 | DZR |  | RVV | Moscow, Russia |  |
| 00149 | RVV | Moscow, Russia | DZR |  |  |
| 00155 |  |  | UMK |  |  |
| 00162 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00166 |  | Moscow, Russia | VKX |  |  |
| 00168 |  | Cuba | SPK |  |  |
| 00169 |  |  | KMI |  |  |
| 00177 |  |  | RSZ |  | RSZ's link ID is 00099. Noted once |
| 00178 |  |  | KRN |  |  |
| 00189 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00190 | JSC | Moscow, Russia | POU |  |  |
| 00191 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00198 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 00209 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00213 |  |  | RNS |  |  |
| 00224 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 00701 |  |  | UFO |  |  |
| 00918 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 03861 | PSN |  |  |  |  |
| 06019 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 07039 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 10020 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10024 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10042 | AVK |  | RPR | Moscow, Russia |  |
| 10042 | RPR | Moscow, Russia | AVK |  |  |
| 10047 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10053 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10064 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10075 | RYS |  | ZND |  |  |
| 10075 | ZND |  | RYS | Moscow, Russia |  |
| 10079 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10097 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10163 |  | Moscow, Russia | UDZ27 |  |  |
| 11063 |  |  | RDT | Moscow, Russia |  |
| 11230 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 12311 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 13005 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20008 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20010 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20043 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 20054 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 20065 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20076 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20087 | RBP71 | Moscow, Russia | RVC47 |  |  |
| 20087 | RVC47 |  | RBP71 | Moscow, Russia |  |
| 20098 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 20108 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 30004 |  |  |  |  |  |


| 30011 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 30022 | KKK | Moscow, Russia | KUA | Russian embassy, Baghdad, Iraq |  |
| 30022 | KUA | Russian embassy, Baghdad, Iraq | KKK | Moscow, Russia | Location unconfirmed |
| 30044 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 30088 |  | Moscow, Russia | RCX81 |  |  |
| 30132 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40007 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 40023 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 40034 | RLX | Moscow, Russia | UXW | Russian embassy, London, UK |  |
| 40034 | UXW | Russian embassy, London, UK | RLX | Moscow, Russia | Location unconfirmed |
| 40078 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40155 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40177 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40878 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 43323 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 50002 |  | Moscow, Russia | CAZ |  |  |
| 50035 |  | Moscow, Russia | JUA |  |  |
| 50046 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 50080 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 50080 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 50088 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 50101 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 50189 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 60003 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 60003 |  | Moscow, Russia | FQX |  |  |
| 60015 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 60047 | DCW |  | URO | Moscow, Russia |  |
| 60047 | URO | Moscow, Russia | DCW |  |  |
| 60069 |  | Moscow, Russia | EWZ42 |  |  |
| 60070 |  | Moscow, Russia | RAU |  | Former link id 00070 |
| 60089 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 60179 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 60191 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 70004 |  | Moscow, Russia | NOB |  |  |
| 70026 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 70026 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 70037 |  | Moscow, Russia | RAD |  |  |
| 70060 |  | Moscow, Russia | DKR |  |  |
| 73004 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 80031 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 80038 |  | Moscow, Russia | RPO |  |  |
| 80050 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 80061 | VNB | Moscow, Russia | WQL |  |  |
| 80061 | WQL |  | VNB | Moscow, Russia |  |
| 80104 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 83111 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 90006 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 90017 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 90039 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |
| 90039 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 90051 | RJA | Moscow, Russia | URS |  |  |
| 90051 | URS |  | RJA | Moscow, Russia |  |
| 90057 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 90215 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 90223 |  | Moscow, Russia |  |  |  |


| TX-call | TX location | RX-call |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| COY851 | Cuba | TRO |
| DYFS |  | CIML |
| KLM |  | APW |
| KNY31 | Russian embassy, New York, USA | LCU |
| PLM |  |  |
| RBI |  |  |
| RCF | MFA Moscow, USSR |  |
| RCF45 |  |  |
| RDI |  | RQF |
| RDK |  | UBI, UCC, UCU, RGP |
| RGP |  | UBI, UCC, UCU, RDK |
| RHT42 |  |  |
| RKD | Moscow, Russia |  |
| RKG | Moscow, Russia |  |
| ROI |  | RCF2 |
| ROK23 |  |  |
| ROK48 |  |  |
| RPD4 |  |  |
| RRA | Moscow, Russia |  |
| RRR37 |  |  |
| RVR39 |  | RTW54 |
| RWA50 |  |  |
| RWV74 |  |  |
| SN7D |  |  |
| UBI |  | UCC, UCU, RDK, RGP |
| UBW |  |  |
| UCC |  | UBI, UCU, RDK, RGP |
| UCU |  | UBI, UCC, RDK, RGP |
| UGL |  |  |
|  |  | ACD |
|  |  | BLA |
|  |  | BNV |
|  |  | BXL |
|  |  | CMU |
|  |  | CMU97 |
|  |  | DMA |
|  |  | DPL |
|  |  | DPU |
|  |  | DSG |
|  |  | EWZ40 |
|  |  | FJN |
|  |  | FRU |
|  |  | GLK |
|  |  | GSW |
|  |  | GVS |
|  |  | KDN |
|  |  | KNA |
|  |  | LMS |
|  |  | LSG |
|  |  | NDO |
|  |  | NMZ |
|  |  | OBX |
|  |  | OTD |
|  |  | OWR |
|  |  | PLM |
|  |  | PSN |
|  |  | PTF |
|  |  | RCA |


|  |  | RKG |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  | RKM |
|  | RLJ |  |
|  | RMM |  |
|  |  | ROL |
|  | RQO |  |
|  |  | RSS |
|  | RXX |  |
|  |  | RZJ |
|  | SCJ |  |
|  |  | TRP |
|  |  | UBW |
|  |  | USN |
|  |  | UXG |
|  |  | WKL |
|  |  | WNK |

M42b Point-to-Point stations

| TX-call | TX location | RX-call |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 2ÂNH |  |  |
| 6JI1 |  |  |
| 7GZR |  |  |
| BEMS |  |  |
| BEZX |  |  |
| BLZ26 |  |  |
| BOPK |  |  |
| BUHN |  |  |
| BV6K |  |  |
| BZL26 |  |  |
| Churm |  |  |
| ChYRP |  |  |
| DEPS |  |  |
| DHUP |  |  |
| dIChs |  |  |
| EBCW |  |  |
| F8PW |  |  |
| FILT |  |  |
| FKLS |  |  |
| FLWW |  |  |
| G3WM |  |  |
| G5OP |  |  |
| GDVA |  |  |
| GENP |  |  |
| GFAR |  |  |
| GLJX |  |  |
| GONU |  |  |
| GTGV |  |  |
| HDKR |  |  |
| HL7D |  |  |
| HXMT |  |  |
| IK7R |  |  |
| JOXQ |  |  |
| JXEN |  |  |
| K4MT |  |  |
| KBAN |  |  |
| KE4T |  |  |
| KOGW |  |  |
| KOLV |  |  |
|  |  |  |


| L2RS |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| L47D |  |  |
| LEQR |  |  |
| LGDF |  |  |
| LKDW |  | PRAT |
| LM7K |  |  |
| LOPR |  |  |
| LQDF |  |  |
| M8TK |  |  |
| MAST |  |  |
| MERG |  |  |
| MI4A |  |  |
| MJFQ |  |  |
| MNBV |  |  |
| MSACh |  |  |
| NLAT |  |  |
| NQOR |  |  |
| NT9P |  | K4MT |
| OBRA |  |  |
| OCFN |  |  |
| OREN |  |  |
| P6OZ |  |  |
| P8RK |  |  |
| PLXW |  |  |
| PRAT |  | LKDW |
| PRBO |  |  |
| PZAK |  |  |
| RBW43 | Murmansk |  |
| RDP5 | Kirov | RMC27 |
| RHM2 |  | RWV72 |
| RION |  |  |
| RKD48 | Moscow | RQS |
| RKV23 | Tyumen |  |
| RMA2 |  | RGK2 |
| RND70 |  | RBW |
| RND72 | Moscow | RWV73 |
| RND79 | Moscow area | RTF6 |
| RND79 | Moscow area | RBW |
| RNI2 |  | RYF2 |
| RNI2 |  | RRQ6 |
| RNSP |  |  |
| RRL2 | Western Russia |  |
| RTK |  | RDI |
| RTW54 |  | RVR39 |
| RUU70 |  | RRF30 |
| RUU76 |  | RUA41 |
| RWI |  | RYF2 |
| RWKJ |  |  |
| RWV73 |  | RND72 |
| RXZ32 | St Petersburg |  |
| RZT71 |  | RCZ32 |
| RZT76 |  | RHM2 |
| RZYV |  |  |
| S3MF |  |  |
| S9IZ |  |  |
| SFDZ |  |  |
| SK81 |  |  |
| SN7D |  |  |
| SNC4 |  |  |


| SONG |  |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| TC8D |  |  |
| TI4O |  |  |
| TKLI |  |  |
| TZ9X |  |  |
| TZBP |  |  |
| UILG |  | UUD4 |
| UL2G |  | UTN7 |
| UOZG |  | UTN7 |
| UTN7 |  |  |
| UTPR |  | NLAT |
| UUD4 |  |  |
| UW9M |  |  |
| UZC2 |  |  |
| VBTW |  |  |
| VGKE |  |  |
| VGTR |  |  |
| W7AD |  |  |
| W9SP |  |  |
| WDAK |  |  |
| WPAD |  |  |
| WS1C |  |  |
| WVXZ |  |  |
| WYGL |  |  |
| Y4MY |  |  |
| YDEW |  |  |
| Z4NF |  |  |
| ZE3Q |  |  |
| ZE4K |  |  |
| ZOLK |  |  |

## Chapter 15: M43

M43 was an international Israeli intelligence network that also included a link with Moscow. Moscow used callsign RK2 on this net. See for further info M43's separate profile, available from the Numbers \& Oddities website. Below is a typical example of M4W/RK2 traffic:

M4W M4W M4W RYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRY M4W M4W M4W RYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRYRY M4W M4W M4W RYRYRYRYRYRYRYR
OK OK QSA 4 QSA 4
I QRU TOO QRU QRU
PLS QSO QSO QSO
OK OK OK TKS TMXQS HAVE A NICE DAY
BYBYBYBY BY BY BY

AND THIS IS A RK2 TRANSMISSION:

RK2 RK2 RK2 464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646
RK2 RK2 RK2 464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646
RK2 RK2 RK2 464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646464646

HR QSA FB QSA 4
ONLY UR WRK QRG 16128 PLS NEXT QSO WRK QRG 16129 OKEJ ?
K OK GA PLS
I QRU QRU
INT QTC
GB GB QRU GB SK QSO
QSO WILL WRK
OK TKS GB SK SK
SK SK


The huge SVR complex outside Moscow

## Chapter 16: Credits and links

All information in this document was submitted by independent radio monitors or has been obtained from public available sources and public sites on the web. Wherever data was obtained via the web or elsewhere, references and/or links to these sources have been noted.

I thank everyone who contributed to this document. Special thanks goes to the now defunct Worldwide Utility News club (WUN) and its members. They reported, collected and analyzed a huge amount of transmissions. WUN published its first Special Topics Report about M42 in March 1995. This team also included Don Schimmel who reported his findings not only on WUN but also in Popular Communications, books and his online column "Radio Intrigue with Don Schimmel". Many thanks to my major advisors and to the Priyom team for the F01, F06, F06a and Perelivt protocol data, and the triple timestamps and layering data; to lan Wraith and other people for creating and updating the Rivet decoder.

The map of Russia is © CIA World Factbook.
The pictures of the FAPSI SIGINT site near Pskov, and SVR are © Google Earth.
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## Relevant websites:

| Utility DXers Forum | www.udxf.nl |
| :---: | :---: |
| Numbers \& Oddities | www.numbersoddities.nl |
| Prioym | www.priyom.org |
| Enigma 2000 | http://www.signalshed.com/ |
| Rivet decoder | Decodes XPA, XPA2, F01, F06, F06a, T600 http://www.signalshed.com/rivet/index.html |
| Agentura | http://agentura.ru/ |
| CIA World Factbook | $\underline{\text { https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html }}$ |
| Min. of Foreign Affairs | http://www.mid.ru/en/main en |
| FSB | http://www.fsb.ru/ |
| SVR | http://svr.gov.ru/ |
| DXing.com | http://www.dxing.com/intrigue.htm |


[^0]:    * Position of messages 4,5 and 6

[^1]:    See further http://priyom.org/number-stations/digital/f06/protocol

